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Abstract: Only recently the debate on bank capital regulation has devoted specific
attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions can play as a part of the overall
minimum capital regulatory framework. Several national regulators have adopted or are
planning to introduce a cyclically adjustable requirement for loan loss provisions and the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is considering how to address provisioning
practices within a broad bank capital regulatory framework. This paper contributes to the
ongoing debate by exploring the available evidence about bank loan loss provisioning
around the world. We find that many banks tend to delay provisioning for bad loans until
too late, when cyclical downturns have already set in, possibly magnifying the impact of
the economic cycle on banks’ income and capital. At the same time, we find a
considerable difference in patterns followed by banks around the world.
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“A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees
danger and avoids it , but one who, when he is ruined is
ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows so
that no one can really blame him.”
J.M. Keynes  (1931)
1.  Introduction
Risk-based bank minimum capital requirements tend to have a pro-cyclical effect
on the economy (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000). The deterioration of
the quality of bank loan portfolios during economic downturns inevitably increases
banks’ risk exposure - and therefore the level of capital requirements - exactly when
capital becomes more expensive or simply unavailable to weaker institutions.
The discussion on this topic has raged ever since the 1988 Capital Accord was
originally enforced in G10 economies and subsequently, following the introduction of
Basle-like approaches by most developed and emerging countries around the world. On
one side, it has become widely perceived that risk exposures need to be explicitly
mirrored in the level of bank capital if regulatory arbitrage is to be avoided and bank
stability pursued. On the other side, potential negative externalities of capital regulation
have been stressed, pointing to the contraction of credit supply that higher capital
requirements may generate during economic downturns. In general, critics of the
solvency ratios discipline warn that controlling individual risk positions may not always
minimize systemic risks and strict capital standards may, for instance, have aggregate
undesirable liquidity effects.
  The discussion has become more animated in the last couple of years as a
consequence of the ongoing revision of the old Basle Capital Accord. This paper
contributes to the ongoing debate by focusing on a frequently ignored aspect of bank2
capital regulation: the role of bank loan loss reserves as a component of bank regulatory
capital. The question addressed is twofold. First, are there good reasons – conceptual and
empirical – for a specific regulation of loan loss reserves within the general regulation of
solvency ratios? Second, is it likely that a distinct treatment of loan loss reserves may
affect the pro-cyclical features of capital regulation?
  Following what appears to be the consensus view among practitioners and
analysts of risk management we relate the volume of bank capital to the size of
unexpected credit losses and loan loss reserves to the size of expected losses. We also
argue that, consistently with this view, loan loss reserves should be left free to fluctuate
over the economic cycle and comply with a minimum requirement to be respected on
average over a predefined period and not at every single moment in time. A constant
minimum requirement would therefore apply to economic capital and an average
minimum requirement would instead apply to loan loss reserves. This approach would
clearly strike a balance between the supporters of the opposing views of risk-adjusted and
cyclically neutral solvency regulation, but its relevance can hardly be defined at a
theoretical level. Bankers would face an additional incentive to look ahead and set
provisions in the good phases of the cycle: “to foresee danger and avoid it” along with the
initial quotation. Only an empirical investigation can show whether bank managers today,
differently from Keynes’ observation, are already pursuing forward-looking pro-cyclical
management of loan loss provisions and reserves, making additional regulatory
incentives redundant.
This paper analyzes the cyclical patterns of bank loan loss provisions followed by
large commercial banks in different geographical areas of the world. We anticipate some3
of the relevant results, noting that clearly different patterns prevail according to the
geographical location of the banks. Bankers on average create too little provisions in
good times and are then forced to increase them during cyclical downturns magnifying
losses and the size of negative capital shocks. We also find an undesirable negative
relation of loan loss provisions with loan growth and GDP growth. However, these
patterns vary considerably within and across different countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 draws from the current debate on the
cyclical impact of banks’ capital requirements. Section 3 discusses the role of bank loan
loss provision in the current debate of banks’ minimum solvency ratios. Section 4
describes the empirical analysis and the data. Section 5 reports the empirical results, and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Bank capital requirements and the economic cycle
The cyclical effects of bank capital regulation have been thoroughly analyzed by a
wide theoretical and empirical literature that has flourished in the 1990s following the
introduction of the 1988 Capital Accord. The concern raised by academic and
policymakers in the wake of the new regulation was that new higher capital ratios could
lead to a reduced credit supply in periods of economic slowdown.
Concerns were twofold. On one side there was the preoccupation that the shift to
a new regulatory regime could impact negatively on the supply of credit with a once for
all effect. A second and more generalized concern was that a risk-based capital regulation
by increasing capital requirements might increase the likelihood of capital shortages4
during recessions potentially reducing the supply of credit to the economy. The
expression “capital crunch” was coined in the early nineties to characterize the
simultaneous shortage of capital and the contraction in the supply of new loans that
affected banks in New England during the early 1990s recession in the United States.
1
A capital crunch could result in the reduction of total bank assets or alternatively
in a shift toward less risky assets such as government bonds. An extensive survey of the
empirical evidence available for industrialized economies, has concluded that “there is
some evidence that bank capital pressures during cyclical downturns in the US and in
Japan may have limited lending in those periods and contributed to economic weakness
in some macroeconomic sector” (Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 1999). Recent
empirical evidence shows that the introduction of more severe capital regulation may
have reduced bank credit supply also across emerging economies (Chiuri et al., 2002).
These concerns have recently been addressed by policy makers as well. The
Financial Stability Forum, for instance, has raised the question whether several features
of the new capital regulation currently discussed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision could increase the cyclical fluctuations of the economy. In response, the
Basel Committee has confirmed that risk-based capital requirements are inevitably pro-
cyclical (more capital is required during recessions exactly because credit risks in banks’
portfolios increase in cyclical downturns) and suggested that the cyclicality question
should be addressed by means of different instruments. For example, national supervisors
                                                          
1 See Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Peek and Rosengren (1995) for evidence in favor of the presence of a
capital crunch during the 1990-91 recession in the US. A contrary view is taken by Berger and Udell
(1994).5
(under Pillar II of the new accord) could request banks to comply with higher than
minimum capital requirements and leave bank capital free to fluctuate above that level.
At a theoretical level, an explicit treatment of the impact of capital requirements
on the level of economic activity is provided by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in a model
that provides a rationale for applying lower solvency ratios in recessions. They find that,
in a world where agents both in the real and in the financial sector may be capital
constrained, market-determined solvency ratios are pro-cyclical, i.e., they are higher
during expansions and lower during recessions. More precisely, they show that a negative
shock to banks’ capital negatively affects the level of economic activity and that the
lower level of investment generated by the capital crunch requires a reduction of market
determined solvency ratios.
Tirole and Dewatripont (1994) also remark that the lack of discrimination
between idiosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks may have undesirable effects by
negatively affecting bank managers’ risk-taking incentives. Bank managers would in fact
be punished both for idiosyncratic shocks, that are under their control, and for
macroeconomic shocks, that are independent from their control. They conclude that Basle
standards are “excessively tough on bank managers in recessions”.
How can concerns about the cyclical effects of a risk based capital regulation be
reconciled with the Basel Committee assessment that risk based capital requirements are
a necessary ingredient of financial stability? This paper suggests that a compromise
between these opposing position may in fact exist. The suggested reconciliation is based
on the recognition that bank capital and bank loan loss reserves perform different
functions and that therefore their regulatory requirements could differ. For example,6
while capital may be regulated by a fixed minimum requirement, loan loss reserves may
be required to meet a minimum requirement on average over a predefined period,
allowing them to fluctuate over the cycle.
3. Loan loss reserves and banks minimum capital requirements
Current minimum solvency regulations commonly refer to a particular notion of
capital called “regulatory capital” which differs from “economic capital” and that results
from the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (Berger et al., 1995). The bulk of Tier 1 capital
is represented by paid-in capital and retained earnings, while Tier 2 capital includes
general loan loss reserves and a variety of bank liabilities characterized by a lower degree
of seniority with respect to other non-capital bank liabilities. The sum of Tier 1 and Tier
2 capital represents the numerator of the solvency ratio and needs to meet minimum
regulatory requirements.
We suggest that a reconciliation of the different views about banks capital
requirements could be envisioned by considering a partition of regulatory capital based
not only on seniority considerations - as is the case for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital - but also
and foremost on risk management considerations. Following the general consensus
among risk management analysts and practitioners, economic capital should be tailored to
cope with unexpected losses, and loan loss reserves should instead buffer the expected
component of the loss distribution. Coherently with this interpretation, loan loss
provisions required to build up loan loss reserves should be considered and treated as a
cost. A cost that will be faced with certainty over time but that is uncertain as to when it
will materialize. Conversely, resources required to build up capital – a buffer against7
truly unpredictable (unexpected) events – should not be dealt with as a cost but should
only come from post tax earnings. A more detailed description of the conceptual
difference between loan loss reserves and provisions and capital and earnings is provided
in Appendix 1.
We can show that a loan loss provision management coherent with an increase of
loan loss reserves in good time and a decrease in bad times reduces bank profit volatility
and the probability of a negative shock to economic capital. Our example draws on Kim
and Santomero (1993). For simplicity, consider a bank that finances each period t a one-
period project of US$ 1. With probability pH the project is a success with payoff (1+rH) at
time t+1 and with probability (1-pH) the project fails with a payoff of 0 at time t+1. Under
risk-neutrality, it follows that the expected return on the project at time t is 1 plus the
risk-free rate rf
) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( f L H H r p r p + = ⋅ − + + ⋅ ,  f H r r > (1)























Under risk-neutrality, the lending rate on loans rL would be set equal to rH. However,
given the possibility of default it is not appropriate to report earnings of rH in case of
success at t+1. To reflect the true underlying profitability of the bank at time t+1, the8
bank should set aside its expected loss equal to the default premium  f H r r − . This has the
effect of smoothing reported bank earnings over time,
2 and reduces the possibility that
the bank has to eat into its capital in case a future project fails (at time t+2, …).
More generally, banks can smooth their earnings by drawing from loan loss
reserves if actual losses exceed expected losses and by contributing additional loan loss
provisions to loan loss reserves if actual losses are lower than expected losses. The
advantage of income smoothing is that it reduces the volatility of reported bank profits
and reduces the possibility that the bank may have to eat into its capital. With perfect
income smoothing, earnings are not (or are less) affected by the fluctuations of credit
losses over the cycle. This is achieved when loan loss provisions compensate for the
difference between realized credit losses and average credit losses by taking positive
values during cyclical expansions and negative values during downturns. As a result, loan
loss reserves would increase in good times and decrease in bad times.
3
Several papers have tested the hypothesis of income-smoothing empirically and
have found different results. Based on data for individual US banks, Greenwalt and
Sinkey (1988), Collins et al. (1995), and Ahmed et al. (1999) have found a positive
relation between loan loss provisions and bank earnings, while Beatty et al. (1995) do not
find evidence of earnings smoothing. Based on aggregate data for European Union the
group as a whole. Our main contribution lies in testing the hyp0thesis of income banking
                                                          
2 Volatility of reported earnings derives in our simplified model purely from accounting practices (i.e. from
an omitted registration of costs that inflates earnings) and has no economic determinants.
3 Our considerations are referred to the present institutional setting where banks’ accounts are
predominantly kept on historical cost basis. In a world where banking assets are valued at “market” (fair)
prices – fully reflecting future expected events – future valuation changes could only be due to unexpected
events and no loan loss reserves would be required in addition to capital (Borio et al. 2001).9
systems, the ECB (2002) finds that differentiated patterns prevail among EU countries
but that a negative relationships between income and provisions characterize smoothing
for banks, to a larger group of countries – developed and emerging -  around the world.
We have argued that the advantage of income smoothing is that the bank achieves
a sounder capital management, since expected loan losses no longer affect bank capital.
While this is rather uncontroversial in our simple model, information imperfections can
make our statement less obvious and more controversial than it may seem at first sight.
On one side there is a widely shared view within the accounting profession that “income
smoothing” has negative connotations because it introduces judgmental modifications to
a firm’s earnings, that also when not induced by personal managers’ objectives, tend to
reduce the comparability of results across firms, and may ultimately damage shareholder
value.
4 An alternative view, prevailing among the economic profession and discussed to a
larger extent in the previous section, is that “income smoothing” has positive
connotations because it reduces the negative impact of asset volatility on bank capital for
risk averse agents.
5
The merit of the debate spurred by these different views is to have clearly spelled
out the set of different incentives that may lead banks to adopt income smoothing
practices. Regulatory constraints on capital would give the bank manager an incentive to
smooth out earnings over time. In addition to meeting capital requirements, a bank
manager may potentially have several alternative motivations for income smoothing.
First, the manager may attempt to positively affect risk perceptions of the bank by
                                                          
4 See Wall and Koch (2000) for a discussion of the relationship between accounting and economic concepts
of bank losses and provisions.
5 See Borio et al. (2001) for a clear exposition of the merits of “income smoothing”.10
reducing earnings variability (Greenwalt and Sinkey, 1988). Second, income smoothing
behavior may result from regulatory constraints or accounting practices (Wall and Koch,
2000). Third, compensation packages of bank managers may encourage income
smoothing behavior (Lambert, 1984). The very fact that bank managers have substantial
discretion to set loan loss provisions, has raised concerns especially from accountants and
bank supervisors that banks mislead the market about their underlying earnings,
providing support to the “accounting view”. However, requiring more information on
banks’ loan loss provisioning behavior to be disclosed is not necessarily optimal if it
gives the banks an extra incentive to manipulate their books in order to present a better
picture (Rajan, 1994).
From the perspective of this paper, the different incentives at work in different
institutional settings are not so important as the final outcome, i.e. whether banks pursue
a policy of income smoothing through a pro-cyclical loan loss provisioning. Such a
policy would in fact have a positive impact on bank’s capital management reducing its
volatility and the fall out of capital shortages on the business cycle.
The dynamic adjustment of loan loss provisions over the cycle - often called
statistical provisioning (Fernandez de Liz et al., 2000) - is coherent with the cyclical
oscillations of reserves proposed by Holmstrom and Tirole (2000), giving flexibility to
regulatory capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) and also avoiding (or reducing) negative shocks to
economic capital (the core component of Tier 1). From a regulatory viewpoint the11
flexibility of loan loss reserves requires only that regulatory requirements be met on
average over a predefined time interval and not continuously over the same time period.
6
The application of this approach to the current Basel regulatory setting (where
general loan loss reserves are allowed to reach up to 1.25 per cent of risk weighted assets)
would translate in a minimum capital requirement of 6.75 per cent of risk-weighted assets
and an average requirement for loan loss reserves of 1.25 per cent of risk-weighted assets,
to be met over a pre-defined number of years (defined according to the average length of
an economic cycle). The level of regulatory capital would therefore vary over the cycle
between a maximum of 9.25 per cent and a minimum of 6.75 per cent of risk-weighted
assets.
From a practical perspective this additional complication of bank solvency
regulation could be avoided should bank managers already face a proper set of incentives
and follow pro-cyclical provisioning practices. We therefore turn to the empirical
analysis of prevailing loan loss provisioning practices around the world where different
fiscal, accounting, and regulatory regimes may prevail and affect provisioning patterns.
4. Data and Methodology
We hypothesize that a bank shows imprudent loan loss provisioning behavior –
susceptible to have procyclical effect on banks’ capital –  if one of the following three
conditions is met:
                                                          
6 It is interesting to observe the similarity with the regulation of compulsory reserves on bank deposit,
where several countries have moved from a fixed ratio to be met at each point in time to an average
requirement to be met over the reserve holding period. The purpose, as in this case, was that of avoiding
undesired negative externalities of prudential regulation on market liquidity.12
1.  Loan loss provisions are negatively associated with banks’ earnings;
2.  Loan loss provisions are negatively related to loan growth;
3.  Loan loss provisions are negatively associated with GDP growth.
Condition (1) refers to the income smoothing hypothesis, while conditions (2) and
(3) capture loan loss provision misalignments with bank-specific and macroeconomic
cyclical indicators.
To verify the nature of the relationship between banks’ provisioning and earnings
and to test our hypotheses about the determinants of banks’ provisioning decisions, we
estimate the following model:
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where loan loss provisions (LLP) over total bank assets for bank i at time t are a function
of profits before tax and loan loss provisions (EBP) over total assets for bank i at time t,
loan growth in real terms ( L ∆ ) for bank i at time t, real growth in per capita GDP
( GDP ∆ ) at time t, and year dummies (T). The dependent variable of the regression in (4)
is the level of loan loss provisions scaled by the one-period lag of total assets.
We use lagged values of stock variables and current values of flow variables to
avoid potential endogeneity problems. For example, loan loss provision at t correspond to
provisions during the year t, while assets at t-1 correspond to the stock of bank assets at














Our critical explanatory variable is given by bank income before taxes and
provisions. We control for bank risk through loan growth and for the economic cycle
though GDP growth. The real growth rate of bank loans is thought to be positively
associated with bank risk, given that rapid growth of bank lending is generally associated
with lower monitoring efforts and a deterioration of the quality of loan portfolios. A
prudent bank should therefore show a positive association between the amount of loan
loss provisions and the growth rate of its loan portfolio. Year control dummies are
intended to catch time-specific effects such as trends in the regulatory stance. We
estimate model (4) using bank-specific random effects. Our empirical specification
follows closely the models used in the literature to test the income-smoothing hypothesis
(see, for example, Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988).
As an alternative model to test the income-smoothing hypothesis we specify a
dynamic model of loan loss provisions by introducing lags of the dependent variable.
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The dependent variable lagged values capture the speed of adjustment of loan loss
provisions to an equilibrium level. The advantage of this formulation consists in a better
approximation of the potential impact of stock variables on loan loss provisions at time t,
captured through the lagged values. This reduces the potential problems related to
omitted variable and makes it possible to focus on the effects of flow variables on loan
loss provisioning. We include the first and the second lag, to take into account a change
of the speed of adjustment beyond the first year.14
The inclusion of lags of the dependent variable renders OLS estimation of (5)
inconsistent. We resort to the GMM difference estimator in Arrelano and Bond (1991) to
get consistent estimates of the above model. This procedure estimate the specific
dynamic model in first-differences to solve the estimation problem raised by the potential
presence of unobserved individual effects  i v  and gives consistent estimates under the
assumption that the error term  it ε   is not serially correlated and the explanatory variables
are (weakly) exogenous. We assume that our explanatory variables are (weakly)
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instruments and the difference estimator is an efficient GMM estimator for the above
model. To assess the validity of the assumptions on which the GMM difference estimator
is based we consider the test of second-order serial correlation of the error term suggested
by Arellano and Bond (1991). If the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation
of the error term is rejected, the GMM difference estimator is not valid.
 Based on the above specifications, our hypothesis of prudent loan loss
provisioning behavior is rejected if one of the following three conditions is met: (1) the
coefficient on earnings EBP is negative; (2) the coefficient on loan growth  L ∆  is
negative; and (3) the coefficient on GDP growth  GDP ∆  is negative. If condition (1)
holds then the hypothesis of income smoothing is rejected. If condition (2) and/or (3)
holds then there is evidence that banks are not pursuing a procyclical provisioning
behavior.
In order to capture both economic upswings and downturns we need to use bank
data for a sufficiently long period. We collect bank balance sheet information from15
Bankscope for the period 1988-99. This period captures both the economic slowdown in
the US of the early 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 1995) and the following upswing in the
mid and late 1990s. For other countries this period captures at least one business cycle,
and for certain countries, notably the East Asian countries, an economic crisis (during
1997-98). Bankscope data refer to the set of large commercial banks in each country, for
which accounting data are believed to be of better quality. Where possible we also use
consolidated balance sheets data. All data are reported in US dollars.
We include in our sample the countries that had over the sample period at least
three commercial banks recorded in the Bankscope database. We have then eliminated
the banks that over the sample period had less than three consecutive years of balance
sheet observations, in order to control for the consistency and quality of bank reporting.
Finally, in order to minimize the effects of measurement errors and outliers we have
filtered out the bank/year observations that exhibited one of the following features:  a
ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets greater than 10 percent; a ratio of
earnings before tax and provisions over lagged total assets larger than 10 percent in
absolute value; or a growth rate of bank loans in real terms larger than 50 percent in
absolute value. These outlier rules roughly correspond to the exclusion of the
observations above the 99
th percentile and below the 1
st percentile of these variables. The
resulting sample includes 45 countries,
7 with a total of 1,419 banks and 8,176 bank-year
observations. We collect real growth rates in per capita GDP from the World
Development Indicators of World Bank.
                                                          
7 The final sample of countries is: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay and Venezuela.16
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics about the variables in our estimation
sample. The ratio of loan loss provisions to lagged total assets equals 0.65 percent on
average (with a standard deviation of 0.88 percent), the ratio of earnings before taxes and
provisions to lagged total assets equals 1.6 percent, and the average rate of real loan
growth equals to 7.8 percent. Table 2 presents the distribution of our sample across years
and countries. Our sample is dominated by French, Japanese and US banks.
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the regression variables. The
correlations indicate a statistically significant correlation between loan loss provisions
and each of the explanatory variables. The correlation between loan loss provisions and
earnings before tax and loan loss provisions is around 21 percent, suggesting that banks
do exercise income smoothing on average. The correlation between loan loss provisions
and loan growth is around –15 percent, suggesting imprudent behavior by the average
bank. The correlation between loan loss provisions and GDP growth is also negative
around –18 percent, suggesting a anti-business cyclical behavior of bank’s loan loss
provisioning.
5.  Estimation Results
Table 4 presents the basic random effects regression results for the model in (4).
We find a positive and significant relationship between the ratio of loan loss provisions
and bank earnings (both scaled by the beginning of period stock of bank assets). These
results are consistent with previous results for the US market (Greenwald and Sinkey,
1988) and suggest that banks in our sample have followed an income-smoothing pattern
on average. A one standard deviation increase in earnings is associated with an increase17
in provisioning of 0.22 percent (the average ratio of loan loss provisions to assets is 0.65
percent). The real loan growth rate has, contrary to expectations, an undesirable negative
coefficient. Banks appear to have increased the amount of provisions during periods of
positive profits but at the same time they have been less prudent during periods of rapid
credit growth. This effect of loan growth on provisioning is economically significant as
well, but somewhat less strong than the effect of a change in earnings. A one standard
deviation increase in loan growth is associated with a decrease in loan loss provisions of
0.13 percent. We also find an undesirable negative relationship between GDP growth and
loan loss provisions, suggesting that banks provision during and not before economic
recessions. Again, this effect is economically significant, and of a similar order of
magnitude as the effect of a change in earnings on provisioning. A one standard deviation
increase in GDP growth is associated with a decrease in loan loss provisions of  0.20
percent.
To allow for an asymmetric pattern of loan loss provisions during periods of
positive and negative earnings, we interact the earnings variable with a dummy variable
that takes value of one when earnings are negative and zero elsewhere (Column 2 in
Table 4). The results indicate that banks make statistically significantly higher provisions
when they incur losses
8 than when they generate a positive level of income before
provisions and tax. The average association between negative earnings and provisioning
is 0.42 (the absolute value of the sum of the coefficient on earnings and the coefficient on
the interaction term between earnings and the earnings dummy variable). This implies
that during cyclical downswings banks eat into their capital to make provisions for loan
                                                          
8 Note that negative EBP times the negative regression coefficient of the interacted term (negative earnings
dummy*EBP) implies a positive effect (increase) on provisions.18
losses, and that therefore on average banks do not provision enough during good times to
cover losses during bad times.
The relation between bank earnings and loan loss provisioning is expected to be
country-specific as a result of the different features of accounting, fiscal and prudential
regulation. To analyze the different behavior across banks located in different parts of the
world we run a series of separate regressions for banks active in different regions. For
this purpose we consider five different regions: Europe, US, Japan, Latin America and
Asia. “Europe” includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom;
“Latin America” includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
and Venezuela; and “Asia” includes India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand.
9 The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. The
regional regressions have two advantages over the whole sample regressions. First, they
allow for cross-regional differences in each of the regression coefficients. Second, the
regional regressions do not suffer from an overrepresentation of banks from one region,
unlike the whole sample regressions, where US and Japanese banks represented a very
large share of the overall sample.
Table 5 reports the results for the five regions when no distinction is made
between periods with positive and negative earnings. The results show that banks in all
regions except Asia smooth their income over time on average. Not only do we reject the
                                                          
9 We exclude Hong Kong from the Asia group because of its significantly higher level of economic
development compared to other countries in the group. Inclusion of Hong Kong banks does however not
alter the results. We do not make a separate for the Oceanic countries Australia and New Zealand due to
lack of bank observations for these countries.19
income-smoothing hypothesis for the Asia region, we actually find a significantly
negative association between earnings and provisioning for Asian banks.
We also find a negative association between credit growth and loan loss
provisioning for each region, consistent with the pooled results in Table 4. The negative
association is found to be strongest in Japan.
10 This effect is strongest for banks in the US
and Japan. The Hausman test rejects the use of random effects against the use of fixed
effects in the case of Japan, Latin America, and Asia (at a 10 percent level). In these two
cases, the fixed effects results do not differ significantly from the random effects results,
and therefore are not reported.
Table 6 shows the regression outcome when the negative earnings dummy is
added. For all the five regions we find that banks with negative income (before tax and
provisions) make more provisions than banks with positive income. For all regions this
difference is statistically significant at a 10 percent level. This suggests that insufficient
provisioning during good times is common practice among banks in different regions, in
particular in Japan and Asia.
Table 7 presents the basic regression results of the dynamic model in (5). The
results are similar to the results in Table 4 where the specification did not include lags of
the dependent variable. Again, we find a positive association between the ratio of loan
loss provisions and bank earnings, suggesting the average presence of income-smoothing,
together with a negative association between loan growth and loan loss provisioning,
which signals that the lack of considerations of the real business cycle effects on creadit
quality.
                                                          
10 See Packer (2000) for a description of the evolution of loan loss accounting practices in Japan.20
The loss of a significant number of observations due to the inclusion of lagged
dependent variables has not affected the estimation result in any significant way
providing a good test of robustness of our results. The coefficients on both the first lag
and the second lag of the dependent variable are statistically significant, suggesting that
banks are slow in adjusting to their optimal path of provisioning over a multiyear
horizon.
 We again add a interaction term between the earnings variable and a dummy
variable that takes value of one when earnings are negative and zero elsewhere to allow
for an asymmetric pattern of loan loss provisions during periods of positive and negative
earnings. The results of this alternative specification are reported in Column 2 of Table 7.
Again, we find that banks make statistically significantly higher provisions when they
incur losses than when they generate a positive level of income before provisions and tax.
This implies that during cyclical downswings banks eat into their capital to make
provisions for loan losses, and that therefore on average banks do not provision enough
during good times to cover losses during bad times.
Tables 8 and 9 report the regression results of the dynamic model in (5) when
allowing for regional differences. Table 8 reports the results without the negative
earnings dummy interaction. We find that banks in Europe, US, and the Latin America
smooth their income over time on average, but our results reject the income-smoothing
hypothesis in Japan and the Asia region. These results differ from those in Table 5, where
we also found evidence of income-smoothing in Japan. The results of the dynamic
specification for US and Japan, though, should be interpreted with caution, due to lack of21
rejection of second-order autocorrelation in the estimates for these two countries, that
may bias the coefficient estimates for these two countries.
Table 9 reports the results when the negative earnings dummy is added.
Consistent with the regression results of the static model in Table 6, we find that for all
five regions that banks with negative income make more provisions than banks with
positive income. However, only for Japan and the Asia countries this difference is found
to be statistically significant, contrary to the results in Table 6 where the difference was
found to be statistically significant (at a 10 percent level) for all regions. The results in 9
thus suggest that insufficient provisioning during good times is more common practice
among banks in Asia, in particular in Japan than among banks elsewhere (in Europe, US
and Latin America).
Overall, the regional results of both model specifications suggest that the loan loss
provisioning behavior of Japanese and Asian banks is the least pro-cyclical among the
five considered regions. This finding may be consistent with the recent financial turmoil
during 1997-98 in the East Asian countries, when it was revealed that many East Asian
banks did not set aside adequate provisions in the 1990s, when credit growth was still
strong, generating a level of loan loss reserves vastly inadequate when compared with the
available level of capital and the amount of loan losses. Regressions results for individual
East Asian countries (not reported) confirm this hypothesis.
The negative relation found earlier for the whole sample between credit growth
and loan loss provisioning is present only in Europe, Japan and Latin America. For Asia,
no significant relation between credit growth and loan loss provisioning is found, and for
the US we find the desirable positive relation between credit growth and loan loss22
provisioning. Banks in the US, Japan, and Asia, also provision less during high GDP
growth, suggesting an undesirable anti-business cyclical behavior of provisioning.
Finally, we find differentiated and significant time patterns across the five
different regions (not reported). For example, in the US case we find that the level of loan
loss provisioning has been decreasing consistently over time during the 1990s. This
finding is consistent with changes in the US regulation on bank minimum capital that
have diminished banks’ incentive to build up loan loss reserves. From 1992 onwards in
fact, with the introduction of the Capital Accord in the US, loan loss reserves were no
longer counted as a component of Tier 1 capital, but were counted towards Tier 2 capital
(up to 1.25% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets). Hence, from the perspective of
compliance with regulatory capital requirements, it became much more effective for US
banks to allocate income to retained earnings (entirely included in Tier 1 capital) than to
loan loss reserves (only partially included in Tier 2 capital).
6.  Conclusions
This paper has suggested that among potential benefits deriving from a risk-based
regulation of loan loss provisions and reserves we should include a beneficial dampening
of the pro-cyclical effects of capital regulation. The econometric evidence shows that
banks on average postpone provisioning when faced with favorable cyclical and income
conditions until negative conditions set in. As a result of very different regulatory and
institutional frameworks, rather differentiated provisioning behaviors prevail among
banks located in different countries.23
While it is becoming increasingly clear among bank regulators that more explicit
recognition should be paid to the problems associated with inadequate provisioning
policies, the solution is not easy to define or to envision as a result of the complicated
interaction of accounting, fiscal and prudential requirements and responsibilities that are
particularly hard to extricate.
This paper provides some new empirical evidence that stresses the importance of
new developments in this area of bank regulation. The results suggest that progress in this
area may benefit all countries, inclusive of more developed ones, but that it may have a
particular bearing for the stability of emerging banking systems.24
Appendix 1:  Loan loss provisions, reserves, and expected losses
Although regulatory capital is intended to provide an adequate buffer against
adverse occurrences to banks’ balance sheets it is not the only relevant buffer bankers can
resort to. The prevailing conceptual framework, summarized in Figure 1, recognizes the
existence of two categories of shock absorbers: loan loss reserves and capital. Regulatory
capital should cope with the occurrence of “unexpected losses”, that is losses that are
large but infrequent and that therefore can be located far in the tail of the frequency
distribution of loan losses. Loan loss reserves should, instead, cope with “expected
losses”, that is losses which occur on average and can be measured by the mean value of
the frequency distribution of loan losses. According to this distinction, the occurrence of
losses equal to OB in Figure 1 should be buffered for the amount OA by loan loss
reserves and for the amount AB by depleting regulatory capital. What Figure 1 makes
clear is that the very effectiveness of regulatory capital as a buffer of unexpected shocks
rests on the existence of the subsidiary buffer represented by the reserves created through
loan loss provisions.
Figure 1: PDF of loan losses, provisions and economic capital








A final clarification concerns the nature of “specific” and “general” loan loss
provisions and their role in the definition of bank capital regulation. According to
widespread accounting practices “general” provisions refer to “ex-ante” provisions and are
related to future uncertain events. “Specific” provisions are instead “ex-post” in nature, in
that they refer to certain events (such as past due payments, or other default-like events) for
which a specific documentation can be produced.
As such, “specific” provisions are somewhat similar to write-offs, can be easily
documented and are not subject to significant restrictions. “General” provisions, on the
contrary, refer to probabilistic losses that cannot be supported by loan specific
documentation and being highly judgmental have been often the subject of regulatory
restrictions. Not always bank regulations refer explicitly to general or specific provisions
but most of the times regulatory requirements can be partitioned among “ex-ante” and
”ex-post” provisioning. For instance, provisions triggered by past due payments (one of
the default events considered by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) could be
considered as “specific” provisions. Provisions which are, instead, required for all loans,
independently from the presence of a default event, can be considered of a “general”
nature.
Since bank solvency regulation is intended to address the consequences of future
credit losses, whether of expected or unexpected nature, only “general” provisions matter
in the discussion of minimum bank capital requirements. “Specific” provisions and
reserves, similarly to write-offs, should not be considered as a buffer against future
losses.26
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Provisioning/Assets equals loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before
tax and loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. GDP
growth is real growth in per capita GDP. The total number of bank-year observations is 8,176 for all
variables.
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Provisioning/Assets 0.652 0.880
EBP/Assets 1.755 1.391
Loan growth 7.771 16.541
GDP growth 3.083 2.656
Table 2, Panel A Distribution of bank-year observations by year
Year
Number of
bank-year observations Percentage of total Cumulative percentage
1989 416 5.09 5.09
1990 494 6.04 11.13
1991 546 6.68 17.81
1992 608 7.44 25.24
1993 628 7.68 32.93
1994 1,119 13.69 46.61
1995 984 12.04 58.65
1996 993 12.15 70.79
1997 987 12.07 82.86
1998 920 11.25 94.12
1999 481 5.88 100.00
Total 8,176 100.00 100.0030
Table 2, Panel B Distribution of bank-year observations by country
Country Name
Number of
bank-year observations Percentage of total Cumulative percentage
Argentina 127 1.55 1.55
Australia 206 2.52 4.07
Belgium 112 1.37 5.44
Brazil 163 1.99 7.44
Canada 128 1.57 9.00
Chile 81 0.99 9.99
Colombia 51 0.62 10.62
Denmark 96 1.17 11.79
Ecuador 17 0.21 12.00
Egypt 62 0.76 12.76
Finland 49 0.60 13.36
France 599 7.33 20.68
Germany 121 1.48 22.16
Greece 53 0.65 22.81
Hong Kong 130 1.59 24.40
India 194 2.37 26.77
Indonesia 92 1.13 27.90
Ireland 33 0.40 28.30
Israel 48 0.59 28.89
Italy 310 3.79 32.68
Japan 1,016 12.43 45.11
Jordan 19 0.23 45.34
Korea 77 0.94 46.28
Malaysia 165 2.02 48.30
Mexico 73 0.89 49.19
Netherlands 144 1.76 50.95
New Zealand 57 0.70 51.65
Nigeria 19 0.23 51.88
Norway 68 0.83 52.72
Pakistan 16 0.20 52.91
Peru 26 0.32 53.23
Philippines 87 1.06 54.29
Portugal 108 1.32 55.61
Singapore 29 0.35 55.97
South Africa 47 0.57 56.54
Spain 350 4.28 60.82
Sweden 50 0.61 61.44
Switzerland 89 1.09 62.52
Taiwan 201 2.46 64.98
Thailand 119 1.46 66.44
Turkey 112 1.37 67.81
USA 2,288 27.98 95.79
United Kingdom 295 3.61 99.40
Uruguay 6 0.07 99.47
Venezuela 43 0.53 100.00
Total 8,176 100.00 100.0031
Table 3 Correlation matrix
Provisioning/Assets equals loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before
tax and loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. GDP
growth is real growth in per capita GDP. ** indicates significance at a 5% level.
Provisioning/
Assets
EBP/Assets Loan growth GDP growth
Provisioning/Assets 1.000
EBP/Assets    **0.205 1.000
Loan growth   **-0.146 **0.223 1.000
GDP growth **-0.181 **0.125 **0.264 1.00032
Table 4 Test of income-smoothing: basic GLS regressions with random effects
The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares with random bank-specific effects for the whole sample of countries and for the period 1988-1999.
Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss provisions over lagged total
assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in US dollars. GDP growth is real growth in per capita GDP. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if profits
before tax and loan loss provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. The Hausman test is a test of systematic difference between coefficients of the fixed effects
and the random effects regression. We report the p-value of the Hausman test statistic. A constant and year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard
errors are between brackets. *** indicates significance at a 1% level; ** indicates significance at a 5% level; and * indicates significance at a 10% level.
Whole sample Negative earnings dummy
EBP/Assets ***.158 ***.225
(.008) (.009)
Negative earnings dummy *(EBP/Assets) - ***-.640
(.034)
Loan growth ***-.008 ***-.008
(.001) (.001)
GDP growth ***-.075 ***-.072
(.004) (.004)
Hausman test (p-value) ***.000 ***.000
R-squared .114 .161
No of bank-year observations 8,179 8,179
No of banks 1,419 1,41933
Table 5 Test of income-smoothing: regional GLS regressions with random effects
The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares with random ban-specific effects for the whole sample of countries and for the period 1988-1999.
Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss provisions over lagged total
assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in US dollars. GDP growth is real growth in per capita GDP. “Europe” includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. “Latin America” includes Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. “Asia” includes India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand.
“USA” indicates United States of America. The Hausman test is a test of systematic difference between coefficients of the fixed effects and the random effects
regression. We report the p-value of the Hausman test statistic. A constant and year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard errors are between
brackets. *** indicates significance at a 1% level; ** indicates significance at a 5% level; and * indicates significance at a 10% level.
Europe US Japan Latin America Asia
EBP/Assets ***.168 ***.174 ***.153 ***.221 ***-.085
(.017) (.013) (.047) (.026) (.027)
Loan growth ***-.008 ***-.006 ***-.017 ***-.010 ***-.008
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.002)
GDP growth ***-.070 ***-.157 ***-.163 -.003 ***-.105
(.013) (.012) (.010) (.017) (.010)
Hausman test (p-value) ***.000 ***.000 .129 .168 *.080
R-squared .133 .306 .416 .213 .257
No of bank-year observations 2,477 2,288 1,016 570 951
No of banks 438 388 145 126 16634
Table 6 Test of income-smoothing: regional GLS regressions with random effects and negative earnings dummy
The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares with random bank-specific effects for the whole sample of countries and for the period 1988-1999.
Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss provisions over lagged total
assets. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if profits before tax and loan loss provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. Loan growth equals loan
growth in US dollars. GDP growth is real growth in per capita GDP. “Europe” includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. “Latin America” includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. “Asia” includes India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. “USA” indicates United States of
America. The Hausman test is a test of systematic difference between coefficients of the fixed effects and the random effects regression. We report the p-value of
the Hausman test statistic. A constant and year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard errors are between brackets. *** indicates significance at a
1% level; ** indicates significance at a 5% level; and * indicates significance at a 10% level.
Europe US Japan Latin America Asia
EBP/Assets ***.209 ***.207 ***.545 ***.280 *.053
(.019) (.014) (.059) (.029) (.032)
Negative earnings dummy *(EBP/Assets) ***-.373 ***-.541 ***-1.329 ***-.444 ***-.590
(.074) (.069) (.131) (.100) (.079)
Loan growth ***-.008 ***-.006 ***-.016 ***-.009 ***-.010
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.002)
GDP growth ***-.070 ***-.160 ***-.148 .000 ***-.091
(.013) (.012) (.009) (.016) (.010)
Hausman test (p-value) ***.000 ***.000 ***.000 .203 *.000
R-squared .149 .323 .481 .242 .300
No of bank-year observations 2,477 2,288 1,016 570 951
No of banks 438 388 145 126 16635
Table 7 Test of income-smoothing: basic GMM regressions with lags of the dependent variable
The regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables.  We include two
lags of the dependent variable, bank-specific fixed effects and year dummies. The regressions are estimated on the whole sample of countries and for the period
1988-1999. Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss provisions over
lagged total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. GDP growth is real growth in per capita GDP. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if
profits before tax and loan loss provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. The autocorrelation test is a test for auto-covariance in the residuals. We report the p-
value of the autocorrelation tests. Year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard errors are between brackets. *** indicates significance at a 1% level;
** indicates significance at a 5% level; * indicates significance at a 10% level.
Whole sample Negative earnings dummy
First lag of Prov/Assets ***.346 ***.334
(.028) (.028)




Negative earnings dummy *(EBP/Assets) - ***-.390
(.059)
Loan growth ***-.003 ***-.004
(.001) (.001)
GDP growth ***-.077 ***-.076
(.006) (.006)
Test for autocorrelation of order 2 (p-value) .112 .152
No of bank-year observations 3,553 3,553
No of banks 1,419 1,41936
Table 8 Test of income smoothing: regional GMM regressions with lags of the dependent variable
The regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables. We include two
lags of the dependent variable, bank-specific fixed effects and year dummies. The regressions are estimated on the whole sample of countries and for the period
1988-1999. Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss provisions over
lagged total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. GDP growth is real growth in per capita GDP. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if
profits before tax and loan loss provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. The autocorrelation test is a test for auto-covariance in the residuals. We report the p-
value of the autocorrelation tests. Year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard errors are between brackets. *** indicates significance at a 1% level;
** indicates significance at a 5% level; * indicates significance at a 10% level.
Europe US Japan Latin America Asia
First lag of Prov/Assets ***.330 ***.274 -.205 -.157 .047
(.053) (.032) (.116) (.111) (.095)
Second lag of Prov/Assets ***.114 .029 -.040 .114 ***-.430
(.041) (.024) (.103) (.111) (.076)
EBP/Assets ***.274 ***.047 .028 ***.164 -.006
(.042) (.024) (.064) (.064) (.077)
Loan growth **-.004 ***.003 ***-.011 ***-.018 -.004
(.002) (.001) (.004) (.006) (.004)
GDP growth -.039 ***-.299 ***-.120 -.044 **-.124
(.029) (.029) (.018) (.036) (.020)
Test for autocorrelation of
order 2 (p-value)
.433 *.080 *.090 .970 .188
No of bank-year observations 1,130 983 574 166 345
No of banks 305 308 142 66 12437
Table 9 Test of income smoothing: regional GMM regressions with lags of the dependent variable and negative earnings
dummy
The regressions are estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged dependent variables.  We include two
lags of the dependent variable, bank-specific fixed effects and year dummies. The regressions are estimated on the whole sample of countries and for the period
1988-1999. Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over lagged total assets. EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss provisions over
lagged total assets. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if profits before tax and loan loss provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. Loan growth
equals loan growth in real terms. GDP growth is real growth in per capita GDP. The autocorrelation test is a test for auto-covariance in the residuals. We report
the p-value of the autocorrelation tests. Year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard errors are between brackets. *** indicates significance at a 1%
level; ** indicates significance at a 5% level; * indicates significance at a 10% level.
Europe US Japan Latin America Asia
First lag of Prov/Assets ***.328 ***.276 -.136 -.142 .056
(.052) (.032) (.117) (.112) (.095)
Second lag of Prov/Assets ***.124 .034 -.009 .160 ***-.382
(.041) (.024) (.102) (.114) (.078)
EBP/Assets ***.381 ***.081 ***.307 ***.260 *.196
(.051) (.029) (.087) (.084) (.105)
Negative earnings dummy
*(EBP/Assets)
***-.512 ***-.131 ***-.885 *-.304 ***-.517
(.143) (.066) (.177) (.174) (.184)
Loan growth ***-.005 ***.003 ***-.112 ***-.017 -.006
(.002) (.001) (.004) (.007) (.004)
GDP growth -.038 ***-.301 ***-.114 -.038 **-.117
(.029) (.029) (.018) (.037) (.020)
Test for autocorrelation of
order 2 (p-value)
.339 **.049 **.044 .828 .232
No of bank-year observations 1,130 983 574 166 345
No of banks 305 308 142 66 124